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Drawing on an Enlightenment tradition of historical sociology, Karl
Marx proposed a comprehensive theory of historical evolution with optim-
istic implications for the future course of that evolution.' What, if anything,
is living in that theory and in the Enlightenment project it exemplifies?
A principal attraction of G. A. Cohen's reconstruction of historical
materialism lies in its contribution to addressing this question. 2 Self-con-
sciously "old-fashioned" (Theory, p. x), Cohen's account of Marxism rep-
resents a sharp departure from the tradition of Western Marxism
inspired by Georg Lukacs's History and Class Consciousness. Where
LukAcs had argued that Marxism is fundamentally a matter of method-
the dialectical method of affirming "the all-pervasive supremacy of the
whole over the parts"3 -Cohen has emphasized the substantive content of
Marxism, locating the "materialist theory of history" at its center. 4
According to Cohen's technological interpretation, historical materialism
is animated by an optimistic vision of the broad patterns of social and
political evolution. It seeks to explain those patterns by reference to the
scarcity-reducing transformations of the "built environment" brought
about by human labor5, and to the implications of those transformations
for the structure of social order. And, drawing its prognoses from this
explanation of the historical patterns, it predicts liberation from toil and
from the social adversity consequent on the need for toil. In a nutshell,
then, historical materialism embraces four principal contentions:
Development Thesis: Human productive power tends to increase over
time.6
Social Adaptation Thesis: Social arrangements "rise and fall" according
to their contribution to the expansion of productive power.
Abundance Thesis: The material adversity that humanity has faced
throughout its (pre)history will eventually be overcome.
Good Society Thesis: Because "social adversity [is a consequence of
material adversity" (History, p. vii), the social adversity that we have
faced throughout our (pre)history will eventually be overcome.
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In the course of elaborating and defending this technological interpre-
tation of historical materialism,7 Cohen has also suggested some "refor-
mulations" of historical materialism designed to address his own "reser-
vations" about it (History, p. viii). I agree that the reservations are serious
and propose here to examine the reformulations prompted by them. I
will argue that the reformulated technological interpretation of historical
materialism, even if true, does not have much power to explain historical
change and does not lend much support to optimistic expectations about
the future course of social adversity. 8 I do not claim that it is inconsistent
with or irrelevant to more substantive historical theorizing with opti-
mistic implications but rather that it is largely indeterminate and that the
interest of historical materialism is correspondingly diminished.
I conclude that the technological interpretation of historical material-
ism has, once more, reached a dead end. Human beings and our social
world could be such that determinate material conditions impose inter-
estingly tight constraints on forms of social order. But the problems of
formulating a plausible theory that expresses this idea suggest that we
are not and it is not. If the Enlightenment project of optimism-supporting
historical theorizing can be sustained at all, it needs richer foundations
than are provided by the central idea of the technological interpretation:
that human social relations must adjust to accommodate the growth in
human productive power.9
Indeterminacy I: Fettering
The historical materialist project is to explain the evolution of social
interaction by reference to changes in the material constraints on such
interaction. Cohen has proposed two main reformulations of historical
materialism, each with important implications for this project. The first,
inmmediately addressed to Marx's notion of "fettering,"10 speaks general-
ly to the question How should we characterize the evolving material con-
straints (the expanding productive power) to which social interaction
must adapt? The second, which suggests restrictions on the explanatory
ambition of historical materialism,1i speaks to the question ust how con-
straining on the forms of social order are the material foundations of
social interaction? In this section I will briefly discuss the former, and in
the next section I will examine the latter in some detail.
Elaborating the Social Adaptation Thesis, historical materialism
claims that the pattern of control over productive resources ("the social
relations of production," or "property relations") changes when the
existing pattern of control impedes or imposes "fetters" on productive
development. How is the idea of fettering to be interpreted? Given the
background commitments of historical materialism, what is needed is an
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interpretation of the notion of fettering that makes two ideas at least ini-
tially plausible (History, pp. 109-110): (1) class societies will eventually
fetter the forces of production; and (2) such fettering will result in a revo-
lutionary transformation of the relations of production. Proceeding from
these requirements, Cohen rejects a conception of fettering in which
social relations fetter productive forces just in case they cause absolute
stagnation in productive development.' 2 Instead he advances a relative
interpretation of fettering in which the existing relations fetter the forces
when the forces do less well than they would under an alternative set of
relations. Skipping interesting details about the role of static and dynam-
ic considerations in the interpretation of "do less well," we arrive at the
proposal that the forces are fettered when "the trajectory of output levels
is less high than it could be" (History, p. 119). When it is, a new system of
property relations emerges that promotes the higher trajectory.
As Cohen points out (History, p. 119), the content and the explanatory
power of the claim that property relations adapt to the requirement of
inducing the highest trajectory of output levels depend on the explication
of the notion of a "trajectory of output levels." He suggests that the rele-
vant notion of output may not be captured best by the idea of gross
national product and may require instead a more "strongly qualitative"
conception of the "standard of living" (History, pp. 120-21).13
Reformulated to accommodate this proposal, historical materialism
would hold that social relations fetter the productive forces and so can be
expected to be replaced when they generate a lower standard of living-
a less good "way of life" (History, p. 121)--than some alternative set of
relations.' 4
This "standard-of-living" conception of fettering has one central
virtue. By affirming that property relations change when their change is
required for a better way of life, it incorporates the optimistic expecta-
tions of historical materialism directly into the formulation of the theory.
But it also faces two difficulties. First, its content is not at all clear and its
consequences for historical materialism as a framework of historical
explanation are correspondingly uncertain. Second, it suggests, without
much elaboration, an account of history whose main thrust is significant-
ly different from the specifically technological interpretation of historical
materialism. Here I will focus on the first of these concerns, postponing
discussion of the second until the concluding section of the chapter. 5s
Putting to the side important questions about the discount rate to be
applied to future improvements in evaluating alternative trajectories of
output, we face two issues in understanding and assessing the standard-
ot-living conception o tettenng. n tne first place, there are issues about
the interpretation of the notion of an improvement in an individual's
standard of living. For example, does more work and more pay represent
an improvement in standard of living? Because historical materialism
does not suppose that the preferences of individuals settle this question,
how are these issues to be interpreted? Second, we need a way to evalu-
ate the standard of living under alternative distributions of advantage, an
issue that is particularly important in view of the conflict-ridden charac-
ter of social change. For example, does a society have a higher standard
of living if it has a higher average level of advantage, even if it also is asso-
ciated with a greater dispersion of advantage? Or a higher sum of advan-
tage, even if the average is lower? Or a higher minimum level of advan-
tage, even if the peak falls? Or does achieving the highest standard of
living only require movement to some position on the Pareto frontier?
Answers to these questions about distribution carry important impli-
cations for the explanatory power of historical materialism, for its plausi-
bility as a theory, and for the historical optimism that it is meant to sup-
port. Suppose, for example, "the highest trajectory" is explicated as
"some trajectory on the Pareto frontier." Then the explanatory power is
diminished. Suppose instead that it is explicated as "the trajectory with
the greatest sum of advantage." Then the plausibility is not very great,
and the foundations for optimis m may be rather weak, because-as
countless criticisms of utilitarianism and other sum-ranking ethical con-
ceptions have noted-it may not be very good news that social relations
are selected according to the sum of advantage that they produce.
So the first source of potentially significant indeterminateness in
Cohen's reformulation of historical materialism lies in the indefinite
characterization of the material constraints-the trajectory of output lev-
els-to which societies are, according to the Social Adaptation Thesis,
bound to adjust. Various responses to this problem are available. It
could, for example, be argued (not very promisingly, I think) that a more
determinate notion of the standard of living is unnecessary, because the
main social changes that historical materialism has sought to explain
(including the development of class divisions and the emergence of capi-
talism) come out as improvements on any reasonable way of making the
notion more precise. Or it might be argued that there is an interpretation
of the notion of an improved standard of living that is reasonably defi-
nite, that fits the main fixed points of historical materialism, and that pro-
duces a plausible account of history. I do not see much reason for confi-
dence about this. In any case, in the absence of a proposal, the
substantive commitments of reformulated historical materialism are
importantly indeterminate, it has limited power as an explanatory theo-
ry, and its support for the optimistic expectations affirmed in the
Abundance and Good Society theses is at best uncertain.
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Indeterminacy II: The Scope of Explanation'6
We come now to the second reformulation. Cohen distinguishes two
tendencies within the Marxist tradition associated with different answers
to the question How much does historical materialism need to explain?
An inclusive tendency seeks materialist explanations for as wide a range
of social phenomena as possible. By contrast, the restrictive tendency-
and, in particular, the minimalist refinement of it that I will eventually
focus on-travels light. Less ambitious in its explanatory claims, mini-
malism carries only the baggage necessary to defend the core theses of
historical materialism.
Cohen embraces the restrictive tendency. Before examining the details
of that embrace, I want to digress briefly from the main line of argument
just long enough to disagree with a view that is suggested in Cohen's
account of the motivations for minimalism.
Digression: Religion and Identity
Cohen presents restricted historical materialism as a natural way to
handle the characteristic neglect by Marxist philosophical anthropology
of the fundamental human interest in self-identification and the common
downplaying by historical materialism of, among others, religious
responses to that interest. The inclusivist response to this alleged down-
playing is to try to explain the content and Importance or, tor eX4Inpl ,
religious self-conceptions in terms of dominant social relations. By con-
trast, the minimalist does not commit to a positive theory about self-con-
ceptions and in particular allows that their content and development is
commonly not fixed by material or economic constraints. Granting con-
siderable autonomy to patterns of human self-understanding, the mini-
malist insists only that they are incapable of altering the basic tendency
to productive growth.17 So if new forms of self-understanding are
required to liberate productive potential-if, for example, productive
growth can only proceed if people come to regard themselves as funda-
mentally individual choosers whose social bonds are all voluntary
undertakings-then those new forms can be expected to emerge.
The point of my digression is to register disagreement with the pro-
posal that the anthropological roots of religious conviction lie in concerns
about identity in the fundamental interest in answering the question Who
am I? I agree that the human interest in identity is fundamental and that
religious convictions-and, probably more commonly, church affilia-
tion-do sometimes provide a partial answer to it. But religious convic-
tions seem to me to be better understood as responding to a different set
of human concerns focused on the meaning and value of life, to such
r - * < _ ... -
158 Joshua Cohen
Minimalist I istorical Materialism
questions as What's the point, anyway? and What, if anything, can I hope
for? rather than Who am I? In short, in addition to fundamental human
concerns about what we are able to do, and who we are, there is a further
matter of "what, if anything, it all means." If Marxist philosophical
anthropology emphasizes the first issue, and the Durkheimian tradition
emphasizes the second, a central feature of the Weberian tradition is its
emphasis on the third.
Minimalism
If we return now from motivations to substance, minimalism princi-
pally affirms that productive power tends to grow and that that tendency
to growth is autonomous. That is, non-material conditions (social rela-
tions, religion, politics) can neither explain the tendency of the produc-
tive power to grow nor stand in the way of that growth. Because of this
affirmation of the autonomy of the tendency to productive growth, the
minimalist argues that when non-material conditions do foster the
growth of productive forces, that fostering is itself explained functionally
in terms of its contribution to the autonomous tendency to productive
development. But beyond this commitment to a material explanation of
those non-material conditions (forms of property, religious ideas) that
are required for material development, minimalism itself has no theoreti-
cal commitments. It imposes no constraints at all on the explanation of
those aspects of social life hat are not mandated as solutions to the mate-
rial problem.
This sketch of minimalism departs in one important way from
Cohen's characterization of restrictive historical materialism. To explain
the difference I need first to distinguish the material basis of a society from
its economic structure.8 Thus, the material basis of a society is provided
by the productive forces available to it, and the economic structure is the
pattern in the distribution of control over the productive forces. When
we put this distinction to work, then, Cohen's restrictive historical mate-
rialism affirms that "the material [basis) explains the economic Istruc-
turec" (History, p. 159, n.8). Minimalism, by contrast, requires only that
the material explains the economic when the economic has material con-
sequences-that is, when the economic shapes the trajectory of the pro-
ductive forces. So restrictive historical materialism is a more substantial
doctrine, supplementing minimalism with the substantive thesis that
changes in economic structure only occur when such changes are
required for the development of the productive forces.
In the rest of this section, I will focus my discussion on minimalism. I
acknowledge that this strategy invites the following response: "Inter-
esting, but irrelevant to anything that I wrote or now believe." I am
undeterred by the risk for three reasons. First, minimalism remains faith-
ful to the "master claim of historical materialism," which is that "it is in
the nature of the human situation, considered in its most general aspects,
that there will be a tendency for productive power to grow" (History, p.
158). Indeed, because minimalism is simply an elaboration of that master
claim, it would only be defeated by what defeats the master claim, and so
it is the final fall-back position for the defender of historical materialism.
Second, I think that certain features of Cohen's view (spelled out below)
suggest that he is prepared to embrace minimalism when it parts compa-
ny with restricted historical materialism; that is, he appears not to treat
materially inconsequential changes in economic relations as creating
problems for historical materialism. Finally, my criticisms of minimalism
focus on its limited interest as a theory of history. But those criticisms
depend on a set of claims that, if true, also provide evidence against
restricted historical materialism; they raise doubts about the interest of
minimalism and about the truth of restricted historical materialism. So it
is not an option to agree with the criticisms, but then to dismiss them as
irrelevant to restricted historical materialism.
With minimalism, then, we have a second source of indeterminateness
in historical materialism, this time located not in the characterization of
the material constraints on social interaction but rather in the account of
the precise limits imposed by those constraints. In particular, because the
material constraints may well be satisfied by a wide range of social, polit-
ical, and cultural forms, and because minimalism makes no prediction
about just which of those forms obtains, minimalism may leave a great
deal about society and politics unexplained.l 9
How disturbing this is (in fact, whether it is disturbing at all) depends
on the extent and significance of what is left unexplained. Intuitively, no
one will be troubled by the inability of a general theory of history to
throw light on the exact size of the House of Representatives (435 mem-
bers) or why some capitalist democracies have systems of proportional
representation while others have winner-take-all electoral systems.
However, the absence of an explanation of the Reformation would seem
to be an important limitation, as would a failure to explain the emergence
of regular elections organized around competing political parties. These
phenomena are, in Max Weber's phrase, of great "cultural significance,"
and so we may be troubled by a theory of history that has no explanation
of them.2 0 But restricted historical materialism (and minimalism as well)
rejects explanatory demands that are imposed in the name of such judg-
ments of importance.2'
Restricted historical materialism is called restricted because it restricts itself
to explaining those non-economic phenomena which possess economic rel-
evance, but there is in restricted historical materialism no suggestion that a
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phenomenon is in some general sense important if and only if it is econom-
ically important.... Unlike inclusive historical materialism, the restricted
doctrine says nothing about economically irrelevant phenomena (History,
pp. 173-74).
So minimalism disavows the aim of explaining phenomena that can-
not be accounted for by reference to material constraints, even if the phe-
nomena have very great cultural significance. Stipulations about the
intended scope of a theory are entirely legitimate.22 But given its under-
lying aspirations, historical materialism may not be able to live with this
stipulation. For the looser the material constraints-that is, the more
diverse the range of social conditions that satisfy the constraints-the
less important is the historical materialist thesis that non-material phe-
nomena are constrained to adjust to material circumstances. Minimalism
could be true but of limited interest if the materially irrelevant properties
of social systems were of great importance-and not simply "in some gen-
eral sense" of "importance" but from the concededly relevant standpoint of
the nature and extent of "exploitation, unfreedom, and indignity" and of
the prospects of overcoming "social adversity" (History, p. vii). Reducing
exploitation, relaxing social and political constraints, and limiting the
indignities that people are made to suffer are all humanly important; a
central concern of historical materialism is to provide insight into the
determinants of these humanly important matters. But minimalism has
nothing to say about these phenomena when they fall outside the man-
date of material constraints-about materially unimportant emancipa-
tions from enslavement, or materially unimportant improvements in dis-
tributional fairness, or materially unimportant extensions of political
rights, or materially unimportant transformations in received concep-
tions about gender, or materially unimportant reductions of constraints
on sexual expression. So if such matters do indeed often fall outside that
mandate, then so much the worse for minimalism.
But do they?
To suggest some support for an affirmative answer I will discuss two
examples. The first is focused on explaining pre-capitalist development,
the second on the emergence of capitalism. I should say in advance that
although the issues that I raise here are common themes in discussions of
classical historical materialism (I have chosen the examples largely for
that reason), they are extensions of the topics that Cohen discusses in
History, and not the immediate focus of the papers on restricted historical
materialism.
Endless Nuances
First, consider the claim asserted in the Social Adaptation Thesis that
social relations rise and fall as a consequence of the development of the
productive forces. If this contention is understood to imply that the fet-
tering of productive forces is causally necessary for changes in the social
relations of production, and not only that social relations give way when
they do fetter productive forces, then minimalism is not committed even
to it. For it is no part of the "master claim of historical materialism," and
so no part of minimalism, to insist that all changes in social relations do
affect the basic trajectory of the productive forces. To use the terminology
I mentioned earlier, it is no part of minimalism that all economic changes
(in social relations of production) are materially important. But if there are
materially unimportant economic changes, then historical materialism
itself imposes no constraints on their explanation. So, for example, mini-
malism is consistent with the view that some alterations in fundamental
property relations--changes that are materially unimportant -are driv-
en by the autonomous (i.e., materially unconstrained) evolution of reli-
gious or philosophical ideas, or by autonomous exercises of brute power
in service of an interest in domination, or by autonomous political strug-
gles aimed at the removal of constraints on choice.
In fact, Cohen suggests this minimalist view in his sketch of "the end-
less nuances 23 of pre-capitalist class history" in Theory (pp. 197-201). He
argues there (correctly, I think) that there is no plausible case for the view
that one pre-capitalist form (e.g., serfdom) rather than another (e.g., slav-
ery) obtains in a certain place because this form is required by the level of
development of the productive forces (Theory, p. 200). So, for example, it
seems implausible that serfdom is better suited than slavery to the devel-
opment of the productive forces, and as a consequence implausible that
the colonate of the late Roman Empire replaced Roman slavery because
serfdom broke the fetters on productive development that slavery had
imposed on Roman agriculture.24 But if this change was, from the per-
spective of productive development, a matter indifferent (just a
"nuance"), then minimalism "says nothing about it" and so would be
equally at home with any explanation of it. Minimalism would, for exam-
ple, be unembarrassed if it turned out that the autonomous evolution of
Christianity or of Stoicism made the decisive difference to the transfor-
mation of agrarian social relations.
On the minimalist interpretation, then, historical materialism can live
comfortably with quite drastic limits on Its explanatory ai ltiul,:, allf,S, 
to account even for the rises and falls offorms of society only when those rises
and falls have important effects on material development. Some will be
troubled by what appear to be massive limits on the capacity of this view
to explain what are commonly understood to be important, interesting,
and world-historical phenomena. Even putting such preconceived
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assume Cohen does) that serfdom was an improvement over slavery
with respect to unfreedom and indignity (abstracting from the complexi-
ties of exploitation). If it was, then the decline of ancient slavery was
humanly important, whatever its material significance may have been.25
And if historical materialism promises to provide a theoretical account of
the determinants of humanly important historical changes-an account
that might serve as the basis for optimism about the future course of
social adversity-then we will be disappointed with the minimalist inter-
pretation of it.
The Case of Capitalism: More Nuances?
Consider next the implications of minimalism for explaining the emer-
gence of capitalism. Here the issues are more complicated and subtle,
and so I need first to set out some background.
According to Theory, capitalism arises because a level of productive
development is reached such that capitalism is required to unfetter the
productive forces (Theory, pp. 197-201; History, pp. 155-56). Thus, capital-
ist property relations are mandateO by the level of productive development
itself, and not, for example, by the cnjunction of that level with antecedent
social relations, or politics, or religion, or culture. In fact, one distinction
between capitalism and pre-capitalist class societies is that the explana-
tion of its emergence is independent of the path leading up to it; prior his-
tory is washed out, because the productive forces themselves impose the
particular form of social relations. Here we have a very strong assertion of
the predominance of material factors in explaining social evolution.
Whatever the merits of this view, Marx appears to have rejected it. His
rejection is suggested most strongly in a pair of letters that he wrote late
in his life on issues of Russian political economy. There Marx dismisses
the view that every society must experience capitalism. He denies that he
advanced "a general historico-philosophical theory" in Capital or that the
argument there about the origins of capitalism committed him to such a
theory,26 not, it must be said, because he entertains the possibility that
Russian culture might represent a permanent obstacle to the develop-
ment of the productive forces. On the contrary, his contention was that
Russia's agrarian property relations would permit it to develop the pro-
ductive forces without capitalism, and that the agrarian property rela-
tions in Western Europe had precluded the development of the produc-
tive forces on a non-capitalist basis.
What is most important for the purposes of the discussion of minimal-
ism, however, are not Marx's conclusions but the reasons for them. A
plausible reconstruction-plausible both as a representation of Marx's
view and as an approach to the issue of alternative patterns of develop-
ment-is as follows. At a certain stage in the development of the produc-
tive forces, their further growth requires among other things an increase
in the scale of units of production, a pooling of productive resources
including labor. In principle (i.e., abstracting from historical background
conditions), this growth might proceed along a number of different social
paths. People might, for example, genuinely choose to pool their
resources because they expect material improvement or hope to enjoy the
company, or they might lack alternative ways to keep themselves alive,
or they might pool resources in response to the direct use of violence.
The actual path depends on circumstances, and in particular on the
antecedent property relations, that is, on the prior form of distribution of
control over the factors of production.
In the case of the evolution of capitalism in England, the crucial factor
channeling the development of the productive forces and growth in scale
along a capitalist path was the antecedent existence of small-scale agrari-
an property, of a class of "free peasant proprietors" controlling land,
labor, and tools and comprising "the immense majority of the popula-
tion." 27 Optimal for small scale production, this system of "absolute
ownership" 28 by peasants brought the productive forces to a level at
which their further development required increases in scale. 29 But small-
scale, private ownership could not itself accommodate the achievement
of scale economies, because it "presupposes the fragmentation of hold-
ings, and the dispersal of the other means of production." 30 Furthermore,
it prevented the necessary increases in scale from proceeding along other
than a rcanitalit nath If thp irrt nrdit-rs startd fram a vrstom of
individualized control over the principal factors of production, their only
realistic path to cooperative labor had initially to feature the disposses-
sion of the producers from their land (either by force or through their
inability to compete) and then the recollection of the producers into larg-
er units of production through the purchase of their labor power on the
market-that is, a path eventuating in the formation of capitalism.31
A crucial point of contrast with the Russian case lies in this prior exis-
tence in England of small-scale agrarian property, that is, of individual-
ized control over the forces of production. In the Russian case, an
antecedently communal form of agrarian property created the possibility
of an alternative path of economic development based on the "rural com-
munity."3 2 The communal form was compatible with a variety of paths
of development and did not exclude the evolution of agrarian capitalism;
it also permitted the large-scale cooperation essential to the development
of the productive forces to proceed without an antecedent dispossession
of agrarian producers and the creation of a labor market.33 Thus, Marx
emphasizes that his argument in Capital about the "historical inevitabili-
ty" of the development of capitalism was "expressly limited to the coun-
t
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tries of Western Europe." And he says as well that the "reason" for this lim-
itation was that the "western movement" involved "the transformation of
oneform of private property into anotherform of private property" and that the
development of capitalism in Russia would require an initial transforma-
tion of "common property into private property."34
The contrast in agrarian property relations is, of course, not the only
important point of difference. Late nineteenth-century Russia also had
available to it the productive forces created by Western European capital-
ism. Underscoring the importance of this difference of "historical con-
text," Marx says that "the contemporaneity of capitalist production-
provides it [Russia] with the ready-made material conditions for
large-scale co-operative labour organised on a large scale."35
But it does not follow from this acknowledgement that Marx did
believe after all that capitalism was the only social framework for the
development of the productive forces, given the state of those forces in
the sixteenth century and abstracting from the antecedent form of agrari-
an property. In fact, the evidence suggests that he did not. When, for
example, he states his "reason" for thinking that Russian development
did not have to be capitalistic-the reason that I quoted in the previous
paragraph-he refers only to the differences in property relations and not
to the advantages of late developers.3 6 Furthermore, the letter in which
he states that reason went through three earlier drafts and was addressed
to the question: Does the argument in Capital about the origins of capital-
ism imply that the Russian commune was "condemned to perish by his-
tory"?3 7 Marx begins each draft with the same answer as in the final ver-
sion: The argument in Capital about the "historical inevitability" of a
capitalist phase of development carries no implications at all for the via-
bility of the Russian conunune because that argument was meant only to
show the inevitability of capitalism given an antecedent system of private
agrarian property. He does not say that the argument carries no implica-
tions because it was confined to an account of the social preconditions of
productive development given a lower level of development than Russia
could achieve by importing Western technology.3 8
Let's assume that Marx's argument is right and that different systems
of agrarian property create different possibilities for subsequent econom-
ic development. The argument is plausible and significant; a natural
extension of it--though an extension that Marx might not have been
happy with-is that diverse histories of agrarian property relations pro-
duce importantly diverse forms of capitalism, with minifundia economies
providing especially favorable social settings for the eventual emergence
of social democracy. On this assumption, then, we have a major social
change-the emergence of capitalism in Western Europe-that is not, as
Cohen suggests in Theory, a path-independent reflection of requirements
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imposed by the level of productive development but a consequence
instead of the requirements of productive development given the prior
system of property relations39 Does this path-dependence raise a prob-
lem for historical materialism? It depends on the version of historical
materialism.
Suppose, as Cohen suggests in Theory, that historical materialism is
required to explain the development of capitalism-and not simply the
evolution of some set or other of social relations that permit the develop-
ment of large-scale production and growth in the forces of production-
and that it is required to conduct that explanation solely with reference to
underlying facts about the productive forces. Then there is a problem.
For what is explained by the facts about the productive forces alone is
not the emergence of capitalism but at most the emergence of some sys-
tem or other of property relations that would permit an increase in the
scale of production.
But minimalism suggests an alternative strategy. Holding fixed the
project of explaining materially important social changes solely by refer-
ence to the constraints set by the forces of production, minimalism may
discharge historical materialism itself from the responsibility of explain-
ing the development of capitalism, requiring only that it explain the
(materially relevant) emergence of some form or other of social relations
that encourages the growth in scale required for material development.
It is of course open to the minimalist to supplement this explanation
with an account of the emergence of capitalism in particular-rather than,
for example, state-owned farms or peasant cooperation-that draws on
factors other than the level of development of the productive forces.
Here, Marx's explanation, which emphasizes the prior system of proper-
ty relations, would emerge as one candidate. But minimalist historical
materialism is designedly ecumenical and in fact equally at ease with
explanations of the specifically capitalist channeling of economic devel-
opment in early modern Europe that draw on a familiar set of historical
and/or cultural and/or political factors-the peculiar configuration of
class power in Western Europe, economic rationalization emerging from
the autonomous evolution of Christian views of salvation, a conception
of individuality whose provenance lies in Greek antiquity, the feudal dis-
persion of political power and autonomous concentrations of urban
wealth in the interstices created by that dispersion, the availability of the
commerce-friendly tradition of Roman law, limitations on the power of
the English state consequent of the failures of Tudor absolutism, the
Reforma tion-inspired redistribution of monastic lands in England, Italian
banking techniques, and so on.
But although mintmalism nas no protvitell :trust The ...urn i
explanations, the theory itself is of limited interest. The burden in the
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explanation of the origins of capitalism is not carried principally by the
material constraints but instead by the non-material and non-economic
filters that limited the way that those constraints could have been satis-
fied under the circumstances. Add to this the further assumption-which
was a central point of Marx's letters on Russian development-that dif-
ferent social relations that are able to increase the scale of productive
cooperation and thereby develop the productive forces have different
implications for the concededly important matters of exploitation,
unfreedom, indignity, and social adversity. Because minimalist historical
materialism has nothing to say about these matters, it does not say
enough about what is humanly important.
In concluding the discussion of these two cases, I want to emphasize
that I do not mean simply to be noting some entries in the register of pos-
sibilities-that restrictive historical materialism could have very limited
explanatory power because of the wide range of material-constraint-sat-
isfying social relations and that it could fail to support the optimism asso-
ciated with classical historical materialism were those diverse social rela-
tions to exhibit humanly important differences. Rather, I mean to suggest
that these are, as a matter of fact, ;ery plausible claims that raise serious
problems for the interest of minimalism.
Conclusions
By way of conclusion, I want to offer a summary and a suggestion.
First, a summary. I began by listing four elements of the technological
account of historical materialism. Consider how matters now stand with
respect to each of them.
1. Reformulated historical materialism remains committed to the
Development Thesis, but the proposed reformulation in the notion of fet-
tering renders the content of that thesis uncertain because of the indeter-
minateness in the conception of a trajectory of output levels.
2. As to the Social Adaptation Thesis, minimalist historical material-
ism embraces the idea that if productive development demands a basic
social change-if a rise and fall is needed-then such change can be
expected to occur. But it rejects the view that a necessary condition for
the occurrence of a change in property relations is that the change is
mandated by the development of the productive forces, thus allowing
that even some changes in property relations may fall outside its scope.
3. As to the Abundance Thesis, absent further specification of the
notion of output, it is not clear why the historical pattern of increases in
output supports a generalization that predicts an eventual overcoming of
material adversity.
4. Finally, concerning the Good Society Thesis, given the potentially
weak constraints that material development imposes on social relations,
it is not clear how, if at all, the embrace of restrictive historical material-
ism enables us to understand the determinants of exploitation, unfree-
dom, and indignity. As a result, it provides limited support for the pre-
diction that humanity will free itself from "social adversity."
Cohen's reformulations of the technological interpretation of historical
materialism strike me as well-motivated responses to reasonable doubts
about and unclarities in the earlier formulation. But the resulting view
seems to explain little and to provide at best thin support for historical
optimism.
Now the suggestion: I have expressed some doubts about the interest
of minimalism, largely by reference to the fact that the humanly relevant
properties of social systems may well be materially irrelevant. But in my
discussion of fettering, I noted that Cohen advances a very expansive
understanding of "output" according to which a society generates a
higher level of output if it produces a higher (or better) standard of liv-
ing, a "better way of life" (History, p. 121). Suppose that we insert this
proposal into the minimalist understanding of material relevance and
that we include such considerations as unfreedom, indignity, and social
adversity 40 in the "strongly qualitative" account of the evaluation of
ways of life. We then end up with a form of minimalism affirming the
material relevance of any change in the distribution of control over
resources that bears on freedom, dignity, and social adversity (and on
whatever else enters into the evaluation of a way of life, and that holds
that such changes occur when their occurrence would result in a better
way of life.
I have not explored this form of minimalism here because it seems
clearly more expansive than the view that Cohen describes as "restrictive
historical materialism." Furthermore, it would need considerable refine-
ment to make it less Panglossian and more believable. But I mention it
here neither to criticize its excessive optimism nor to suggest that it
resists more precise and plausible formulation. Rather (fulfilling a
promise that I entered earlier), I want to draw attention to the extent of
its departure from the technological interpretation of historical material-
ism. In fact, the form of minimalism I just sketched is, more or less, a
restatement of the common intuition or vision that animates all the classi-
cal progressive philosophies and theories of history: a vision of historical
tendencies to human improvement-to a "better way of life" (History, p.
121)--and of social transformations as accommodating those tend-
encies. 41 The technological version of historical materialism represents
one proposal about how to turn that vision into a more systematic theory
distinguished from others by its emphasis on the progressive human
mastery of nature, its contention that social relations adapt to that
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increasing mastery, and its affirmation of the substantive thesis that such
mastery is closely tied to human improvement more generally (see
Theory, p. 147).
But the problems with that version may not be problems with the
basic vision. In the face of those problems, those who are attracted by the
vision should resist responding to difficulties in historical materialism by
adopting the strategy of substance-reducing revision. Instead, we should
consider whether there are more promising renderings of the optimistic
conception of history. Such renderings would have three main features
that distinguish them from the technological interpretation of historical
materialism: (1) they would expect less from the material constraints on
human interaction in explaining historical evolution; (2) they would
acknowledge (as Marx did in his account of the sources of capitalism in
Western Europe) the importance of the "dead hand" of the past in chan-
neling the course of such evolution; and (3) they would acknowledge
(following the hint in Cohen's new conception of fettering) the non-mate-
rial character of human interests in reducing unfreedom, exploitation,
and indignity, and they would attach greater importance to those inter-
ests-greater importance both in evaluating the standards of living made
available by alternative social arrangements and in explaining the evolu-
tion of new frameworks of social order 42
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